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Affirmative Action in America: Procedures and Outcomes 
 
 
Affirmative action is a step beyond simply ensuring equal treatment through 
antidiscrimination policy measures.  It is an activist approach to trying to increase the 
representation of historically underrepresented groups, whether in the workforce, in particular 
occupations, in higher-paid, more prestigious positions, in the political system, or in higher 
education.  As such, it is a more controversial policy than antidiscrimination policy and can 
generate more resistance, whether passive or active, but it also holds the promise of enacting 
more radical change in society towards the ultimate goal of equality of both opportunity and 
outcome for members of different groups. 
In this paper I first briefly outline the history of affirmative action policy in the United 
States.  I discuss its current institutional design and enforcement as well as its interaction with 
US antidiscrimination policy. Then I consider whether US affirmative action policy has had 
measurable effects.  Given that the Korean program is focused on improving employment 
outcomes for women, I focus on the US studies relating to affirmative action’s effects on women 
workers rather than on minority workers. However, it is interesting to contrast affirmative 
action’s effects on minorities with its effects on women in thinking about the limits on 
affirmative action’s ability to create change in the patterns we see regarding gender in the 
workplace, and thus I mention some comparative results as well.  I close by considering the 
potentially necessary conditions for affirmative action policy to be successful in improving 
women’s position in the workforce. 
 2 
Background 
Starting in June 1941 with Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 8802, a series of 
executive orders
1 barred discrimination by federal contractors on the bases of “race, creed, color, 
or national origin.” In March 1961, John Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 required federal 
contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that 
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national 
origin.”  It specified further: “Such action shall include, but not be limited to, the following: 
employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or 
termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including 
apprenticeship.” It created the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 
chaired by Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and granted the Committee the authority to impose 
sanctions, including contract termination, on noncompliers.  This order is the foundation for 
affirmative action as we understand it through the present, and is also the origin of the term.  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (EEOC), which enforces the federal laws prohibiting job 
discrimination (which include the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, Title I and Title V of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990, and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Lyndon Johnson's Executive Order 11246 of September 1965 
strengthened enforcement by outlining in greater detail the procedures for determining 
                                                 
1 An executive order is a directive issued by the US President, similar to a decree in other countries.  This is not 
explicitly covered in the US Constitution, though there is a vague grant of executive power therein.  Such orders 
have been issued since 1789 and include the Louisiana Purchase and the Emancipation Proclamation. An executive 
orders may be overturned by Congress either by passing legislation that conflicts with it or by refusing to fund 
enforcement of the directive.  In practice, either action is rare to unheard of. Also, while executive orders have been 
challenged in the courts, only two have ever been overturned. 3 
compliance, the sanctions for noncompliance, and by establishing that the Department of Labor 
and the EEOC would coordinate in sharing relevant data and in enforcement of these laws.   
Johnson’s Executive Order 11375 in 1967 took the key step of extending affirmative 
action on the basis of sex as well as the four previous bases. However, effective regulations 
enforcing this expansion did not reach full stride until after the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, which strengthened enforcement of Title VII, giving the EEOC authority to litigate, 
and expanded its reach to educational institutions and government bodies (federal, state, and 
local) as well as to employers with as few as 15 employees (before it had been 25).  All federal 
contractors and first-tier subcontractors with 50 or more employees (or a contract worth $50,000 
or more in a twelve-month period) must take actions including maintaining written affirmative 
action plans containing goals and timetables for correcting deficiencies in equal employment 
opportunity 
In October 1978 Jimmy Carter’s Executive Order 12086 consolidated into the 
Department of Labor all of the different federal agencies’ contract monitoring functions related 
to equal employment opportunity provision. This expanded the purview of the Department’s 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance, originally established by the Secretary of Labor 
following Executive Order 11246. The renamed Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
Programs (OFCCP) collects relevant data and enforces the order and subsequent related orders 
and legislation. 
As women’s participation in higher education and in the workforce expanded in the late 
1970s, politicians began to take a broader view of women’s participation in employment and 
how it might be assisted by government actions.  Carter’s 1979 Executive Order 12138 created a 
National Women’s Business Enterprise Policy, which  required each executive branch 4 
department and agency to “take affirmative action in  support of women's business enterprise in 
appropriate programs and activities,” including but not limited to “management, technical, 
financial and procurement assistance....business-related education, training, counseling 
information  dissemination,” and “procurement.” Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 called 
for establishment of a federal Glass Ceiling Commission, to study “the manner in which business 
fills management and decisionmaking positions” and to prepare recommendations concerning 
“eliminating artificial barriers to the advancement of women and minorities” and “increasing the 
opportunities and developmental experiences of women and minorities to foster advancement of 
women and minorities to management and decisionmaking positions in business.” 
In March 1995, Bill Clinton called for a review of affirmative action, which was 
completed by two of his aides by July 1995, at which point he reaffirmed his administration’s 
support for affirmative action. The Glass Ceiling Commission’s report appeared in November 
1995, bringing more attention to the issue of women’s and minorities’ progress up corporate 
career ladders, but not leading to additional legislation. 
One of the final pro-affirmative action moves during the Clinton Administration took 
place in 2000, when the Department of Labor began an Equal Opportunity Survey.  Surveyed 
federal contractors were asked to report not only employment data, but also compensation data 
by gender and minority status.  This data was meant to be used to improve the OFCCP’s 
compliance audit procedures (i.e., deciding which contractors to audit).  However, under the 
Bush Administration, the Department first reduced the number of surveys (from 50,000 down to 
10,000) and then, in September 2006, eliminated the survey altogether.  While the Bush 
Administration has not dismantled affirmative action, it has not expanded its mandate either. 
 5 
Current Institutional Design and Enforcement 
Commentators often refer to the whole set of antidiscrimination laws and executive 
orders mentioned above as affirmative action (Welch 1981).  Using that broad definition, almost 
all employers and employees, save for those in the smallest firms, would be subject to 
affirmative action. A narrower view of affirmative action’s coverage would be to consider only 
Executive Order 11246 (as amended) and the related parts of the 1972 Equal Opportunity Act as 
embodying affirmative action (as opposed to antidiscrimination), and thus to consider only 
federal employees and those employers monitored by the OFCCP, namely federal contractors, as 
subject to its requirements. 
However, this would be inappropriately narrow in thinking about which firms have stated 
that they are following affirmative action principles in their employment practices.  Many 
organizations that are not required to have an affirmative action plan nonetheless have them, to 
varying degrees of formality.  In addition, government employees, who make up a large 
percentage of the workforce, are covered by these principles. These include 5 million state 
government employees, 1.8 million federal government employees, and 700,000 postal service 
employees.  Also, some states, counties, and cities have affirmative action statutes, with which 
contractors with those governments’ agencies are required to comply.  Thus, out of the total US 
workforce of about 146 million employed persons, a sizable proportion (I estimate 28 to 40 
percent) are in workplaces that are covered by either a required or voluntary affirmative action 
plan. 
Even if only private sector employers under OFCCP’s jurisdiction are considered as 
being subject to affirmative action, this covers a large number of employers and employees—
over 20 percent of the civilian workforce (about 29 million workers).  These contractors need to 6 
have a written affirmative action plan detailing the “good faith” efforts they are undertaking to 
recruit, retain, and provide advancement opportunities for the covered groups.  They are 
supposed to collect applicant flow data, keep applicant files/applications for a two-year period, 
use recruiting services and pipelines that will given them access to the covered groups, keep 
copies of all job advertisements, and indicate in all such advertisements that they are an “equal 
employment opportunity employer.” 
Hiring committee members within organizations and firms, as well as, of course, human 
relations/personnel department professionals, have become increasingly familiarized with these 
procedures.  In my own university, every time we run a search for a new faculty member, we 
have a meeting with the university’s affirmative action officer to remind us of these steps.  We 
keep data on all of our applicants in a spreadsheet coded to indicate their gender, race, Hispanic 
status, and nationality or country of origin, to the extent we can determine it.  Universities 
(though not mine) also routinely send postcards to faculty applicants asking them to indicate 
their racial and ethnic background; however, since applicants are not required to fill out these 
postcards as a condition of employment, much of this information goes unreported.  At the end 
of the initial stage of our search (including after our initial interviews at the national economics 
association meetings), we have to turn in a report to the Dean of our division of social sciences, 
indicating the composition of the applicant pool and making specific requests to bring certain 
candidates to campus for the final selection phase.  We are supposed to detail our good faith 
efforts to increase the pool of women and minority applicants, including describing our outreach 
(which routinely includes posting our job notices on listservs that attract more women, such as 
the feminist economist listserv; running an advertisement on the National Economic Association 
website, which is the association for African American economists; and calling the head of the 7 
American Economic Association minority fellowships and summer training program). Wesleyan 
University as a whole tracks new hires as well as the percentage of woman and minority 
members of the faculty and staff. 
 In general, private employers with 100 or more employees and all federal contractors 
with 50 or more employees are required to file an annual report with the EEOC, the EEO-1 form. 
About 50,000 employers, representing more than 55 million employees, file this report.  The data 
are confidential, so only pooled statistics are made public.  The current EEO-1 form is appended 
to this paper as an exhibit. The EEOC can investigate employers for violations of Title VII and 
the other antidiscrimination laws.  However, since its purview is both wider than the OFCCP and 
not focused on affirmative action but rather discrimination (though below we shall see that the 
two forms of investigation are intimately linked), I will not describe its procedures in detail, but 
rather will explicate the OFCCP’s procedures in investigating firm’s behavior.
2 
The OFCCP selects federal contractors for audit, or what they call a “compliance 
evaluation.”  The OFCCP’s new Active Case Management system allows them to prescreen the 
universe of contractors using statistical patterns to decide whom to audit. The OFCCP is 
currently focusing enforcement on firms practicing what it calls “systemic” discrimination. This 
is parallel to the concept of class discrimination, as used in civil discrimination suits, and implies 
an ongoing or recurring practice, rather than isolated acts of discrimination. This approach 
appears conducive to supporting the affirmative action part of OFCCP’s purview, as the pattern 
could include underrepresentation of women and minorities in the firm’s workforce as well as 
apparent low promotion rates of these groups to higher levels in the firm.  However, the OFCCP 
                                                 
2 In many ways the two agencies have similar operations, though the EEOC is a larger operation and has a larger 
caseload than the OFCCP. This is largely because individuals can initiate cases with the EEOC, under multiple 
statutes, though most of these cases are related to individual rather than systemic discrimination claims.  The EEOC 
tends to prosecute only on the large, class action claims; thus, they mediate many more charges than they litigate. 8 
also claims it selects some firms for auditing completely at random.  If a firm has been audited, it 
cannot be subjected to re-review during the next two years. 
The OFCCP begins the evaluation with a “desk audit,” requiring the firm to provide 
statistics for the previous two years on their workforce composition (which, at any rate, they 
were supposed to have been collecting and filing). The OFCCP is particularly interested in 
considering the employment representation part of the audit and in comparing these firm 
statistics to workforce availability statistics deemed relevant to the firm’s situation.  These would 
include considering the workforce composition for the geographic area from which the firm 
typically draws its workers, and for the particular occupations and levels within occupations 
(e.g., educational qualifications) that the firm utilizes.  Again, the firm was already supposed to 
be collecting and considering these availability statistics in formulating its affirmative action 
plan. A rough guideline for firms to consider regarding compliancy is the “four-fifths rule,” as “a 
selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) 
of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal 
enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact” on that group of the firm’s employment 
procedures (Department of Labor). However, even relative selection rates greater than four-fifths 
could be regarded as evidence of adverse impact. 
The OFCCP can proceed beyond the desk audit to a fuller review of firm information, 
including detailed records on employees, and may choose to make an on-site visit/review.  Upon 
conclusion of the full review, the OFCCP will either issue a closure letter (no violations found), a 
closure letter with minor violations, or a draft conciliation agreement (if major violations are 
found).  Under the conciliation agreement, the firm is supposed to make good-faith efforts to 
correct the shortcomings/violations detailed in the agreement and to report back to the OFCCP 9 
on these efforts.  If the firm does not choose to accept conciliation upon negotiation of a final 
agreement, the OFCCP can make a “recommendation of enforcement,” which would detail the 
problems found and suggest remedies, including back pay, front pay, and reinstatement of 
employment (Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP 2008).  Financial agreements obtained totaled over 
$51 million in 2007, a record amount.  The OFCCP can have companies debarred, i.e., made 
ineligible for Federal contracts due to having violated Executive Order 11246. This list is 
publicly available in the web-based Excluded Parties Listing System. 
Bergmann (1996) points out that the majority of audited firms are found to be 
noncompliant; however this may be in part related to nonrandom selection (even before the use 
of the Active Case Management system) by the OFCCP of firms that are more likely to be 
noncompliant, though also likely speaks to the difficulty of achieving full compliance for many 
firms.  The probability of  a firm being selected in a given year is small but not negligible; in 
fiscal year 2007, OFCCP carried out 4923 compliance evaluations (down from the Bush 
Administration high of 6529 evaluations in 2004).  
Thus we see that the “stick” approach to enforcement of affirmative action is the threat of 
a company’s having to undergo a compliance review, and the costs, trouble, and potentially 
unpleasant publicity both within and outside the firm that this entails.  A compliance review 
often includes hiring outside counsel, and any number of law firms offer advice and support to 
firms undergoing audit (Creasman 2008, Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP 2008).  There is also the 
possibility of additional financial penalty relating to patterns uncovered during the audit, 
including back pay awards to applicants denied hiring or promotion. 
The OFCCP does try to provide positive reinforcement for companies as well as negative, 
but it is much more minor and involves positive publicity rather than any cash award. The 10 
Secretary of Labor’s Opportunity Award is given each year to a federal contractor “that has 
established and instituted comprehensive workforce strategies to ensure equal employment 
opportunity” (the 2007 award winner is Raytheon, a major defense contractor). They also give 
several Exemplary Voluntary Efforts Awards to contractors who “have demonstrated through 
programs or activities, exemplary and innovative efforts to increase the employment 
opportunities of employees, including minorities, women, individuals with disabilities, and 
veterans” (the 2007 award winners are Cornell University, Public Service Enterprise Group, and 
Rush University Medical Center).  The OFCCP does not publicly list companies that they are 
auditing, or that they consider to be bad examples—other than of course the companies that have 
been debarred. 
 
Effects of Affirmative Action 
There have been a number of studies that try to assess the effects of affirmative action on 
employment patterns and other outcomes in the US economy.  Economists Holzer and Neumark 
have written a useful series of articles (2000a, 2000b, 2006) assessing what we do and don’t 
know about affirmative action, both from their own studies and from other people’s studies.  It is 
clear that the main area of interest in the US studies has been minority outcomes rather than 
women’s outcomes.  Most of the more recent (post-2000) research and discussion has focussed 
on the effects of actual and proposed changes in preferential admission on minority university 
enrollments.  Given that women comprise a majority of US undergraduate students and have 
achieved or surpassed parity in many graduate fields and professional schools as well, it is not 
surprising that there would be little focus on gender effects of affirmative action in higher 
education (though there is interest in effects on gender balance in the professoriate as well as the 11 
role of mentoring in increasing the pipeline of women and minorities).  The second most popular 
topic of study is the effect on minorities’ employment patterns. Women’s employment patterns 
come in at a distant third in terms of research emphasis.  Regarding subsectors of the economy, 
there has been more interest in studying government positions, including in particular a fairly 
substantial literature on the effects of affirmative action on police force composition (cf. Sass 
and Troyer 1999, Lott 2000, and McCrary 2007—though again with more focus on race), and 
some work on female federal government employees (Dolan 2004).  The corporate workforce 
has not been studied as much (though Holzer and Neumark 200a, 2006 list some case studies); 
nor have independent professions, contractors (though see Carvajal 2006), or the construction 
industry been studied (though see Price 2002). 
How might one measure the impact of affirmative action on women's employment 
patterns? One way is to compare changes in female employment in the covered sector with 
changes in the uncovered sector. For instance, several studies compare federal contractors, who 
are covered by affirmative action, with similar employers who are not covered. While studies 
concentrating on the effects of affirmative action on women's employment in the early 1970s 
found little effect—or even net employment losses—for white women (Goldstein and Smith 
1976, Heckman and Wolpin 1976), by the late 1970s black women appeared to have benefited 
substantially, and white women somewhat. In 1974, 27.6 percent of the average federal 
contractor workforce were white women, compared with 39.4 percent among noncontractor 
employees (Leonard 1989). Because federal contractors are more likely than noncontractors to 
be in the manufacturing sector and less likely to be in the service or retail trade sector, we would 
expect women's employment share to be lower among contractors. However, women's 
employment growth in the contractor sector outstripped growth in the noncontractor sector. By 12 
1980 employment of white women had increased by 1.2 percentage points among contractors, 
but only by 0.6 percentage points among noncontractors. Thus it appears that affirmative action 
has had a modest effect in increasing white women's employment. Black women have made 
more sizable employment gains overall, but less of a difference in growth rates appears between 
sectors. 
Studying the effect of affirmative action on federal contractors overstates the impact of 
implementing affirmative action throughout the economy to the extent that contractor gains 
represent a reshuffling from noncontractors that could not occur if there were no uncovered 
sector. Alternatively, it can understate the effect if there are spillover effects on noncontractors or 
use of voluntary or state- (or county- or city-) mandated affirmative action among noncontractors 
that raises their female employment as well (and thus part of the base-level rise in female 
employment in both sectors was because of widespread adherence to affirmative action 
principles). 
Griffin (1992) critiques this sector-comparison methodology on different grounds, 
pointing out that there are no specific statistical controls for wage and technology differences 
between the sectors. Economic theory predicts that firms subject to affirmative action will have 
higher costs than firms that are not if they find hiring restrictions binding in the sense of limiting 
their ability to substitute between inputs (e.g., between black workers and machinery). Griffin 
finds that such constraints were binding in 1980 and that “the cost of complying with affirmative 
action averaged 6.5 percent of total costs for constrained firms” (p. 259). This indicates that such 
restrictions may cause supply to contract in the covered sector, thereby reducing the sector's 
demand for labor. One could interpret this as a social cost of enforcing integration. Indeed, 
Holzer and Neumark’s (2000b) study using data from employer surveys in the early 1990s does 13 
find that affirmative action increases the number and type of recruitment and screening methods 
that employers use, but that it also increases the number of minority and female applicants, 
increases employers' willingness to hire stigmatized applicants, and increases employers' 
likelihood of providing training and formal evaluation of employees. 
Holzer and Neumark’s employer survey data provides a useful complement to the studies 
that use the federal contractor data, because in their set employers who have voluntary 
affirmative action plans, or plans required by nonfederal governments, are also coded as having 
affirmative action, thus expanding the definition of the covered sector.  Their data are limited in 
geographic range however, as they derive from a sample of four major metropolitan areas 
(Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles).  Nonetheless, they also find evidence of 
employment gains for women and minorities.  Lastly, they find (1999) that there is no evidence 
of lower job performance by women and minority affirmative action hires, though they do find 
that they have lower educational qualifications.  
It is the case that these studies support the view that affirmative action has had positive 
effects in expanding employment for women and minorities. There is also a fair amount of 
evidence in support of the view that affirmative action has had positive effects on earnings for 
women and minorities. 
These gains appear to have come with little ill effect in terms of measurable drops in 
quality of output or other indicators that would suggest a loss of efficiency in the economy from 
implementing affirmative action.  In part this may be because the extent of, and thus the effect 
of, affirmative action compliance has not been that high.  Or it could be that affirmative action 
actually improves efficiency if it overrides discriminatory impulses that were efficiency-14 
reducing.  But it indicates that any dire concerns about constraints on competitive behavior 
appear unfounded. 
 
How Might Affirmative Action Policy Become More Effective? 
Assuming that we would like to further expand the representation of women (and 
minorities) in the workforce and in the better-paying, more secure jobs, there are a number of 
reasons to be optimistic regarding the continued role of affirmative action as an agent in 
effecting change.  
To be sure, many policies exist on paper but do not affect company’s dealings much in 
practice.  Economist Jonathan Leonard (1994), in his working paper for the Glass Ceiling 
Commission on affirmative action enforcement, cites numerous ways in which enforcement 
could be improved (mainly by devoting more resources to audits and by being stricter regarding 
remedies), none of which have actually been enacted since the report was released.  In addition, 
numerous commentators (cf. Bergmann 1996, 1999) do not think affirmative action as currently 
enacted (let alone as currently enforced) goes far enough towards generating equal outcomes for 
different groups. 
Also, there is some reason to believe that the extent of affirmative action is limited in 
range, at least when applied to women.  The implementation of affirmative action policies 
provides an interesting case study in the contrast between such policies' more sizable effect on 
minority employment—particularly for blacks and Hispanics—and the small effect on white 
women’s employment. It appears that workforce sex segregation in the form of distribution of 
workers between the covered and uncovered sectors, where the sector covered by affirmative 
action is more male-dominated (and appears to contain relatively better-paying jobs), has not 15 
been greatly influenced by these policies.  If one believes that this distribution between sectors is 
driven at least in part by supply-side considerations, i.e., women and men choosing to enter 
different occupations rather than being slotted into them by employer actions (whether motivated 
by employer, employee, or customer discrimination, or through some form of imperfect 
information regarding women and men’s relative abilities), then it also implies that there is a 
limit on how much affirmative action can integrate occupations further. 
However, it is not at all clear that this limit has yet been reached.  Recall that the main 
way in which affirmative action plan violations are identified is through looking to see if a 
particular firm’s workforce is out of line with the supposed availability of workers in the relevant 
labor market.  If a firm’s workforce is not in line with the expected proportion of, say, women, 
then the only way that the firm can make up for this is by increasing the proportion of women, 
whether through increased hiring or increased retention of women (which may often involve 
promoting them more rapidly than men).  Thus the firm is forced to practice affirmative action in 
order to reach parity with the overall labor market.  And thus stragglers are forced to catch up. 
This implies that affirmative action has a natural limiting range in how long it can be 
generally applicable.  If all firms had workforces that were in line with the overall market 
availability of women, it would no longer be necessary to practice affirmative action in hiring 
(except to the extent that women and men might have different turnover rates). 
This also underscores how in the US legal system, with the relative ease by which 
plaintiffs can bring discrimination suits in which one basis is disparate impact and another is 
disparate treatment, supports affirmative action even in firms not directly subject to OFCCP or 
other regulations.  Thus the additional fear of discrimination suits, which often range widely in 
topic from pay differentials to hiring differences to promotion differences, support the relatively 16 
weak direct suasion that OFCCP can bring by making firms not only accountable to the EEOC as 
well, but to private suits that can be brought under Title VII. 
For instance, in my work as a consultant on litigation discrimination, I see a firm’s 
affirmative action plans, as well as their failure or success in meeting their own outlined goals, 
routinely considered as evidentiary in cases relating to disparate treatment and/or disparate 
impact.  Thus if a firm shows no progress in meeting their goals over time, this information, 
coupled generally with other indicators of problems in reaching equal employment opportunity 
(and outcomes), will be helpful in forcing the firm into a settlement that is more favorable to the 
plaintiff(s). 
It is true that there has been “pushback” regarding affirmative action in the US, 
particularly as reflected in state-level legislation. In the states of Washington, California, and 
Michigan, voters have supported propositions (Initiative 200 in 1988, Proposition 209, in 1996, 
and the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative in 2006, respectively) that have rolled back use of 
affirmative action by their states in employment, contractor selection, and university admissions, 
and in general rule out preferential treatment on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, or national 
origin.  Interestingly, proponents of these measures cite the 1964 Civil Rights Act (and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14
th Amendment to the US Constitution) as supporting their actions.  
It is also true that to the extent that women still are less likely to enter the workforce than 
men, are less likely to have continuous work histories, and are less likely to work full-time or 
overtime hours, that they are still less likely to be represented in the top positions within firms, 
and still less likely to be among the highest earners within any occupation (Jacobsen 2007).  
Thus supply-side factors, including, most importantly, women’s continued greater involvement 
in the family, affect women’s progress in the workforce.  At every point in the career pipeline, 17 
and at every critical career juncture—whether a promotion, tenure, or partnership decision—
women are more likely to fail to be chosen or to fall behind pace than are comparable male 
candidates (Jacobsen 2005). 
Nonetheless, it appears unlikely that affirmative action in the workplace, in the sense 
particularly of continuing to monitor and pressure laggard firms whose workforce is noticeably 
different in gender and minority composition from comparable firms, will be rolled back, even as 
new administrations are elected at both the national and state levels. 
Thus, the conditions in the US, at least as compared to many other countries, provide a 
strong basis for optimism.  First, there is an increasingly well-educated workforce of women and 
minorities, thanks to improved (though not perfect in the case of minorities) general access to 
higher education.  Thus there is no shortage of qualified women and minorities in the workforce 
as a whole, although the distribution (of women in particular) varies significantly across 
occupations.  In addition, with the current demographic composition of the US being such that 
there will be many retirements in the near future as the baby boomer generation ages out of the 
full-time labor market, opportunities for minorities in particular (who tend to be younger than the 
general population) should be expanding.  Second, the legal system allows for initiative in 
bringing suits against discriminating firms, whether by the government or a private party, and 
these suits lead to examination of patterns in hiring in such a way that the natural remedy in 
many cases will be to hire in greater than proportionate numbers so as to have overall workforce 
be in proportion.  Third, the very length of time that these laws and executive orders have been in 
operation have now entrenched them in our social system.  You cannot get a managerial position 
in the personnel department of any firm of reasonable size without being familiar with these 
regulations.  Firms are increasingly used to filing these data and to complying with these 18 
regulations, at least on paper.   While familiarity can breed contempt for the principles embodied 
in these policies, it can also make them part of the regular practice of firms without being subject 
to constant discussion. 
Let me close this paper by considering the lessons, if any, that Korea can gain from the 
US experience.  First, time will help.  As firms become used to the paperwork, it will become 
routine.  Second, having an educated workforce of women is helpful.  On the other hand, if 
women are not supported in their family obligations, then it will still be unlikely that they will 
persist in career tracks that require long hours and steady work attachment.  Thus, additional 
two-career household and family-friendly workforce policies are necessary, both in the society as 
a whole and in firms, for women to be able to balance these demands on their time.  Third, to the 
extent that other aspects of the legal and administrative system support the affirmative action 
policy, it will reinforce it through general support for antidiscrimination policies, both formally 
and informally enforced.  I am not sufficiently familiar with the Korean legal system to know 
how much it is possible to coordinate these policy initiatives.  My guess is that it is quite similar 
to the US system in basic structure, but that your citizens are less litigious than are ours and that 
you have fewer lawyers per capita, including fewer labor lawyers specializing in employment 
actions. 
Finally, conferences such as this one are helpful in continuing to legitimize and support 
policies to increase the representation and good treatment of women in the workplace.  To the 
extent that the broader society supports these goals and becomes increasingly familiar with what 
is necessary to achieve these goals, it will be easier for firms to see that support of such policies, 
in action as well as words, is not only appropriate but necessary in order to operate in today’s 
civilized society. 19 
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